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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




UTAH OFFICE OF THE, : CASE NO. 20041046 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
SUPPLEMENT TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Comes now the Appellant and hereby provides this Supplement to 
Appellant's Brief. Although copies of the Step 5 and Step 6 hearings in this 
matter were attached to Appellant's docketing statement, Appellant hereby 
requests the clerk of court to supplement Appellant's brief with the eight attached 
copies of the Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of May, 2005. 
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Appellant FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY - 5 2005 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOHN D. SORGE, hereby certify that on the 5th day of May, 2005,1 
caused to be hand-delivered, two true and exact copies of the foregoing 
SUPPLEMENT TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF to: 
J. Francis Valerga 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Agency Counsel Division 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt LakeCity, Utah 84114-0857 
and a copy to: 
Robert W. Thompson 
Administrator 
Career Service Review Board 
1120 State Office Building 
Capitol Hill 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1561 
JOHN D. SOR< 
Appellant 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
JOHN D. SORGE, : 
Grievant, : FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : and DECISION 
UTAH OFFICE OF THE : 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, : 
Agency. : Case No. 20 CSRB/H.0.298 
A Step 5 hearing was held in the above-entitled matter on March 31, April 1-4 and 9,2003, 
at the State Office Building in Salt Lake City, Utah. The hearing was conducted by K. Allan Zabel, 
Hearing Officer for the Career Service Review Board (CSRB). John D. Sorge (Grievant) was 
present and represented himself, pro se. The Utah Office of the Attorney General (Agency) was 
represented by Stephen Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General. The management representative 
in attendance for the Agency was Mary Noonan. A verbatim record of the proceedings was made 
by certified court reporters. Witnesses were placed under oath and testimony and documentary 
evidence were received into the record. 
AUTHORITY 
The authority of the CSRB to hold this Step 5 hearing is found at Utah Code, §67-19a-406 
(2002), and Utah Administrative Code, R137-M etseq. (2002). 
Having heard and reviewed the evidence of record and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, this Hearing Officer [Presiding Officer, Utah Code Subsection 63-46b-2(l)(h) (2002)], 
now makes and enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision. 
ISSUES 
The issues presented by this case are: 1) Was Grievant dismissed for just cause or for the 
good of the public service, as provided for in Utah Code Annotated, §67-19-18; and 2) If not, what 
is the appropriate remedy? 
//<r 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Grievant has been employed by the state of Utah as an Assistant Attorney General since 
approximately April 1999. Prior to that, he worked as an attorney in the Box Elder County 
Attorney's Office. 
2. Grievant's duty station was in the Ogden Office of the Agency until he was involuntarily 
transferred to the Agency's Clearfield Office on July 3,2002. 
3. On or about December 20, 2001, while in the Ogden office, Grievant was placed on a 
Corrective Action Plan. At all times prior to and since its implementation, Grievant has disputed 
the allegations on which the Corrective Action Plan was based. 
4. Part of the Corrective Action Plan required Grievant to review a video tape concerning 
sexual harassment in the office, to not make any comments to the support staff of a sexual nature, 
and to treat the support staff with respect at all times. 
5. The Corrective Action Plan was terminated early by management during February 2002. 
6. Kirk Torgensen, Chief Deputy Attorney General and, at the time Grievant was placed on 
the Corrective Action Plan, Acting Chief of the Child Protective Services Division of the Agency, 
met with Grievant after the Corrective Action Plan was implemented to discuss the Plan and what 
was expected of Grievant. 
7. In the time following the conclusion of the Corrective Action Plan, Mr. Torgensen met 
with other staff members of the Ogden office. During these visits, Mr. Torgensen became concerned 
about the negative feelings in the Ogden office which seemed to focus on Grievant. 
8. During the same period, Mr. Torgensen met with Grievant and asked him to apologize 
to the Ogden staff. In other meetings during this period, Mr. Torgensen and Grievant had many 
discussions about the issues, particularly concerning Grievant5 s relations with co-workers and 
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) workers. 
9. While at a training conference held at the Homestead in Heber Valley during the latter 
part of May 2002, Mr. Torgensen met with Mark May, Grievant's immediate supervisor, and 
Mary Noonan, who had become the new Chief of the Child Protection Services Division. They 
discussed Grievant's relations with his co-workers in the Ogden office, his job performance, and an 
EEOC complaint filed by one of the Ogden office workers, Lynnette Martinez, against Grievant for 
sexual harassment 
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10. In their discussion, Mr. Torgensen, Mr. May and Ms. Noonan decided to transfer 
Grievant to the Clearfield office. This decision was motivated in part because they felt it would be 
satisfactory to Lynette Martinez as part of a settlement with her on her EEOC complaint. They also 
felt the transfer would be a way of providing Grievant with an opportunity for a "new start." 
11. When Grievant arrived at the Homestead for that day's session of the conference, 
Mr. May invited Grievant to join their discussion. Grievant was informed of the decision to transfer 
him to the Clearfield office. Grievant was very vocal in his opposition to the transfer. 
Mr. Torgensen told Grievant that the atmosphere was such that Grievant had to be very careful to 
avoid any perception of offensive conduct. 
12. Grievant was given an "unsuccessful" performance evaluation in June 2002. Grievant 
disputed the justification for the performance evaluation just as strongly as he did the earlier 
Corrective Action Plan and the notice of his involuntary transfer to the Clearfield office. However, 
Grievant stipulated in the Step 5 hearing that the performance evaluation did place him on notice that 
he was to avoid any comments of an offensive nature to co-workers. 
13. On June 27, 2002, a paralegal from the Clearfield office, Jennifer Howell, traveled to 
Ogden and delivered keys for entrance into the Clearfield office building to Grievant. She also 
explained about the parking situation at the Clearfield office and answered Grievant's questions 
about the commute between Ogden and Clearfield. 
14. Upon her return to her office in Clearfield, Ms. Howell sent an email to Grievant's 
supervisor, Mr. May, notifying him that she delivered the keys and of Grievant's response. 
15. The lead attorney for the Clearfield office at the time of Grievant's transfer was 
Janice Ventura. Ms. Ventura testified that she had no animosity or negative feelings about Grievant 
at the time of his transfer, and that she had always been able to work well with him when she worked 
as an attorney for the Office of Guardian ad Litem in the Logan area prior to her joining the AG's 
staff, other than one incident in Logan in which Ms. Ventura felt that Grievant had assaulted her by 
pointing and shaking his finger near her face during a verbal altercation between the two. 
16. Another witness, Dianne Balmain, also an attorney for the Office of Guardian ad Litem, 
had a conversation with Ms. Ventura during a conference at Midway, Utah in May 2002. In this 
conversation, Ms. Ventura repeated to Ms. Balmain several times, "I can't stand John," referring to 
Grievant 
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17. On or about July 18,2002, Ms. Ventura held a staffmeeting in the Clearfield office. The 
staff consisted of herself, Grievant, Ms. Howell, and a secretary, Lori Trivino. During the course 
of the meeting, Ms. Ventura mentioned a security incident which had recently occurred at the 
Bountiful DCFS office. Ms. Ventura noted that two male investigators in the Bountiful office carry 
concealed hand guns. At this time, Grievant told the others that he, too, had a Concealed Firearms 
Permit and a "sweet gun," and that he used hollow-point bullets. Grievant also described the nature 
of the damage caused by hollow-point bullets. 
18. Both Ms. Ventura and Ms. Howell became very alarmed by Grievant's statements about 
his gun and bullets, and felt threatened by him by reason of the statements. Ms. Howell became so 
frightened from that time on that she always went to or from the parking lot in fear of whether 
Grievant was present or might show up while she was there. 
19. The other staff member present at the July 18 meeting, Lori Trivino, felt that while 
Grievant's gun comments put her on alert that there might be days when Grievant could bring a 
loaded gun to the office, she was not apprehensive about it and did not feel it was a threat or a 
danger. 
20. Grievant and counsel for the Agency, Mr. Schwendiman, stipulated that although 
Grievant had once owned a 9mm pistol, he had in fact sold the handgun prior to becoming employed 
with the Agency. However, he maintained his Concealed Firearms Permit after he sold the handgun. 
21. The Attorney General has filed a lawsuit against the University of Utah challenging its 
policy prohibiting handguns on campus pursuant to possession of a Concealed Firearms Permit. He 
also notified the Utah Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) that he considers its 
rule prohibiting concealed weapons possession by state employees while on the job to be a violation 
of State law. Some time after receipt of the Attorney General's notice, DHRM rescinded the rule. 
22. On or about July 23,2002, Grievant entered Ms. HowelFs office and first asked her what 
she felt about the venue of a case involving sexual molestation of a minor. The sexual acts occurred 
in the area of Hurricane, Utah, but the victim was now staying with a relative in the Clearfield area. 
Grievant then proceeded to read sexually graphic material to Ms. Howell. Ms. Howell made 
repeated attempts to contact the caseworker by telephone during the conversation, which lasted about 
45 minutes, but was unsuccessfiil. Ms. Howell felt she could not tell Grievant to discontinue reading 
the material because "he was her boss," and because "she was afraid of him." 
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23. Ms. Howell felt offended and violated by the words that Grievant had read to her. She 
became sick to her stomach while he was reading the material. After Grievant left her office, she 
cried. Upon Ms. Ventura's return to the office, Ms. Howell told Ms. Ventura what had happened. 
The next day was Friday, July 24, a State holiday. 
24. After Ms. Howell's return to the office the next week, she made a complaint to Mr. May 
about the July 23 incident. She later met with Mr. May and Mr. Torgensen to discuss her complaint. 
25. Mr. Torgensen, in consultation with Mr. May, decided to have the Division of 
Investigations conduct an internal investigation into Ms. Howell's complaint about the July 23 
incident. Between July 27 and September 9,2002, the investigators, Jade Pusey and Ross Larsen, 
interviewed Ms. Howell, Ms. Ventura, Ms. Trivino, Darrel Armstrong and Grievant. At the 
conclusion of their interviews, Mr. Larsen prepared a written report which was submitted to 
Mr. Torgensen. 
26. During Mr. Larsen's interview with Ms. Howell on August 29, 2002, Ms. Howell 
reported that on the previous day, August 28, Grievant had made a comment to Ms. Howell which 
she felt was racist. 
27. In the morning of August 28, 2002, Ms. Howell overheard part of a conversation 
between Grievant and another person in Grievant's office. After the other person left Grievant's 
office, Ms. Howell went to Grievant's office and asked Grievant what had been said. Grievant said, 
referring to a case, "In the Hispanic culture 25-year-old men often have sex with 14-year-old girls." 
Ms. Howell immediately stood up and responded loudly, "That is so wrong. It is not at all true and 
I am very offended." Grievant replied that it was not his statement; Darryl Armstrong made the 
statement. 
28. Aiter the discussion in Grievant's office on August 28, Ms. Howell returned to her 
office. Ms. Trivino, who had overheard Ms. Howell's response to Grievant, was concerned and went 
to Ms. Howell's office. Ms. Howell was visibly very upset by the incident. Ms. Trivino reported 
Ms. Howell's getting upset to Ms. Ventura as soon as Ms. Ventura returned to the office. 
Ms. Ventura, Ms. Trivino and Ms. Howell then took a walk to a nearby Conoco station. During the 
walk, Ms. Howell explained what had happened between her and Grievant that morning. A little 
while later, Ms. Howell took the rest of the day off. 
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29. Ms. Ventura reported the incident on that same day to Mr. May, saying, "The situation 
is getting out of hand with Mr. Sorge, and you need to do something about it right away." 
Ms. Howell also reported the incident, via email that same day, to Mr. May. 
30. Upon receipt of Ms. Howell's email, Mr. May decided to have the August 28 incident 
rolled into the investigation of the July 23 incident. 
31. Mr. Larsen interviewed Grievant on September 4,2002, as part of the investigation. At 
the beginning of the interview, Mr. Larsen gave Grievant the Garrity warning. In his interview with 
Mr. Larsen, Grievant's responses to questions began to develop inconsistencies, and during the 
course of the interview, Grievant changed his statements of the facts several times. For example, 
Grievant at first acknowledged that he may have talked with Ms. Howell on July 23 about the venue 
issue in the case in question that day; later in the interview Grievant could not remember talking to 
Ms. Howell about the case. At the beginning of the interview, Grievant seemed confused, which is 
very common in such interviews, but as the interview progressed, Grievant became evasive and 
demonstrated selective memory. 
32. From July 18,2002, until his interview with Mr. Larsen on September 4, Grievant was 
never told by Ms. Howell, Ms. Ventura, Mr. May, or anyone else in management that Ms. Howell 
had made complaints about his conduct. 
33. After receiving the investigative report of the July 23 and August 28 incidents, 
Mr. Torgensen, Ms. Noonan and Mr. May met to discuss it and decide what should be done next. 
34. During the discussion, Mr. Torgensen reached the conclusions that Grievant had 
displayed a pattern of unacceptable conduct; that management felt they could no longer control that 
conduct; and that any discipline short of termination was not a viable alternative. Therefore, the 
decision was to recommend to the Attorney General that Grievant's employment with the Agency 
be terminated. The Notice of Intent to Terminate was thereafter issued on September 27, 2002. 
35. Grievant timely appealed the Notice of Intent to Step 4 of the grievance process. The 
Attorney General assigned another Chief Deputy, Raymond Hintze, to conduct the Step 4 informal 
hearing. Before holding the hearing, Mr. Hintze conducted his own investigation into the allegations 
made against Grievant. Grievant was then given an opportunity to be heard on October 10,2002. 
Mr. Hintze felt Grievant was unable to recognize the impact his words and actions had on others; 
that Grievant failed to demonstrate that he was trying sufficiently to alter his conduct; and that the 
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Agency was too much at risk by reason of Grievant's continuing conduct. Therefore, Mr. Hintze 
drafted the letter terminating Grievant's employment, which the Attorney General signed on 
October 17,2002. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
L Grievant's appeal from the termination was timely. 
2. Grievant received multiple notices as to the conduct which was of concern to Agency 
management, and knew or should have known that continued conduct causing offense to co-workers 
and clients could lead to his termination from employment. 
3. Grievant's comments regarding his Concealed Firearms Permit, gun possession, and the 
bullets he preferred to use did not violate a universal standard of conduct such as to justify or support 
termination. 
4. Grievant's comments and actions on July 23, 2002, constituted a violation of Agency 
office policy 2.11, Sexual Harassment. 
5. Grievant's comments and actions on August 28,2002, caused offense to both a co-worker 
and, ultimately, to a DCFS worker, in violation of directions and instructions given to Grievant by 
management. 
6. Grievant's comments and actions on July 23, and August 28,2002, his responses during 
the investigative interview with him, and his subsequent responses to management caused 
management to lose confidence and trust in Grievant's ability to comply with Agency policies. 
STANDARDS 
The standards for considering the discharge of State employees are: The agency dismissing 
an employee bears the burden of proof that the dismissal was for just cause. Utah Code, 
§67-19a-406(2)(a). (2002). The evidentiary standard by which the agency must meet its burden of 
proof is "substantial evidence." Utah Code, §67-19a-406(2)(c), (2002). Substantial evidence "is 
that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
support a conclusion." Larson Limestone Co. v. State, 903 P.2d 429,430 (Utah 1995) quoting First 
National Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163,1165 (Utah 1990); see also Zissi v. 
State Tax Commission, 842P.2d 848,853 (Utah 1992). "It is more than a mere * scintilla' of evidence 
and something less than the weight of the evidence." Johnson v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Commission. , 842 P.2d 910,911 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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At the Step 5 hearing, the Hearing Officer has the responsibility to determine whether the 
factual findings, as determined by substantial evidence, support the allegations made by the agency, 
and whether the agency has correctly applied relevant policies, rules, and statutes. Utah 
Administrative Code, R137-l-21(3)(a), (2002). If the Hearing Officer determines that the factual 
findings support the allegations of the agency, then the Hearing Officer must determine, giving 
deference to the agency's decision, whether the agency's disciplinary action is excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. Utah Administrative Code, 
R17-l-21(3)(b), (2002); CareerService ReviewBoardv. Utah Department of Corrections, 942P.2d 
933 (Utah CtApp. 1997). 
DISCUSSION 
The Agency's decision to terminate Grievant rests on three factual allegations: first, that 
Grievant threatened co-workers by comments he made respecting ownership of a Concealed 
Firearms Permit, a handgun, and hollow-point bullets; second, the reading of sexually graphic 
material to a paralegal without any business necessity; and third, the making of a culturally and 
racially insensitive remark. 
Concealed Firearms 
The factual findings in this case do not support the Agency's allegations that Grievant 
threatened co-workers by making comments about his Concealed Firearms Permit, handgun and 
bullets, Grievant denied making any gun comments in the staff meeting. However, three witnesses 
testified they heard the comments. While two of those witnesses may have held a bias against 
Grievant, which will be discussed in greater depth at later points in this decision, the third witness, 
Lori Trivino, testified also that the comments were made by Grievant. Ms. Trivino's testimony was 
not shown to be biased in any way, and is therefore considered fully credible. Therefore, the Hearing 
Officer concludes that Grievant did make the gun comments attributed to him in the July 18 staff 
meeting. 
While two of Grievant5 s coworkers, Janice Ventura and Jennifer Howell, claimed to feel 
threatened by Grievant's gun comments, the Hearing Officer concludes for several reasons that 
Grievant did not intend the comments to be threatening, and the two co-workers were grossly 
oversensitive to the comments. 
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First, Grievant's comments were not made under circumstances that would lend support to 
the theory that Grievant had any reason to openly or impliedly threaten his co-workers. The 
comments were made in a staff meeting only after the lead attorney in the office brought up the 
subject of security and mentioned that two DCFS investigators in the Bountiful DCFS office carried 
handguns. 
Second, the staff meeting was held within three weeks after Grievant began working in the 
Clearfield office, and there is no evidence that Grievant was aware of any difficulties with his 
co-workers at that point in time, or that Grievant had any reason to be angry with his co-workers. 
Third, the reaction of the lead attorney, Janice Ventura, and the paralegal, Jennifer Howell, 
and their subsequent fear of Grievant do not appear to have any justification or basis in fact. 
Ms. Ventura testified "It was the way he said it," in telling about Grievant's gun comments. There 
is no evidence whatsoever that Grievant has ever displayed physical anger (as contrasted with 
emotional anger) or violence in the work place. Ms. Howell wrote an email to Mark May on July 22, 
2002, in which she said: 
It seriously bothers me to know that he has a gun and knowing the 
situation in the office and his past, it causes me a great deal of 
anxiety stress. I AM FREAKED OUT. If for some reason he should 
get angry because the "lawsuit" [sic] I wish we could be informed so 
as to protect ourselves from his rage. [Capitals in the original; 
holding added.] 
Ms. Howell testified that she had no knowledge of Grievant's past, except for a statement 
from Lynette Martinez that Ms. Martinez had filed an action against Grievant over an issue of sexual 
harassment. She further testified that she saw a "pattern." The pattern consisted of Ms. Martinez's 
action against Grievant, a news article about a claim of sexual harassment made against Grievant 
while Grievant was running for county attorney, the gun comments by Grievant on July 18, 
Grievant's alleged rudeness when Ms. Howell delivered office keys to Grievant just prior to his 
transfer, and the transfer itself. However, none of these matters rise to the level of evidence that 
Grievant was a violent person or that he harbored a "rage." 
Ms. Ventura testified that when she talked to Mr. May about the issue of the gun, Mr. May, 
who Ms. Ventura knew had worked with Grievant for several years, told Ms. Ventura that he 
(Mr. May) did not believe Grievant would ever do anything to harm any of the staff. Mr. May's 
Sorge v. Ofc of AG, 20 CSRB/H.O. 298 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision Page 9 
statement could be interpreted as a "hope," but again, there is no evidence of Grievant ever 
displaying physical violence in the workplace. 
Fourth, Lori Trivino was also in the July 18 staff meeting, heard Grievant5 s gun comments, 
and felt the comments were not threatening and did not give her any reason to feel alarmed or 
frightened. These four matters, taken together, strongly evidence an overreaction by Ms. Howell and 
Ms. Ventura, and refute management's conclusion that Grievant violated a universal standard of 
conduct by threatening his co-workers. 
It is also clear by reason of the Attorney General's public stance regarding guns at the 
University of Utah and in State offices, that Grievant did not violate any known policy by his 
possession of a Concealed Firearms Permit. 
Offensive Comments 
The factual findings in this case do support the Agency's allegations that Grievant read 
sexually graphic material to his paralegal on July 23,2002, without a business purpose, and that he 
made a racially derogatory remark on August 28,2002. Grievant strongly disputes both allegations. 
However, theie is reliable evidence to support the allegations, while Grievant5 s own testimony 
appears to be self-serving. 
The July 23,2002 allegation appears to be a "he said, she said" type of incident. Ms. Howell 
is a less than credible witness. The Hearing Officer is very troubled by her obvious animosity 
toward Grievant, which was evidenced from the day she first met him after the announcement of his 
transfer. On June 27,2002, Ms. Howell took office keys to Grievant at his Ogden office preparatory 
to his transfer to Clearfield. When she gave Grievant the key and key card, Grievant responded in 
a manner that Ms. Howell felt was rude. She returned to her office in Clearfield and sent an email 
to Mr. May informing him of the encounter because she thought he "would like to know." 
Ms. Howell testified that she meant nothing in particular by the statement, yet for some unexplained 
reason she felt it necessary to inform Mr. May of what happened. 
Ms. Howell later also wrote about Grievant's "past" and his "rage" without, according to her 
testimony, any negative feelings about Grievant or his transfer into the Clearfield office. She 
testified that she experienced fear every time she entered the office parking lot. Janice Ventura, the 
lead attorney in Clearfield, wrote an email referring to Ms. Howell's fear of what Grievant might do 
because of his "anger." All of the written evidence of Ms. Howell's feelings about Grievant is 
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diametrically opposed to her testimony that she knew of no instances of violence or physically 
abusive conduct by Grievant This conflict between Ms. Howell's written documents referencing 
Grievant and her testimony about not having feelings of animosity toward Grievant lead the Hearing 
Officer to conclude that Ms. Howell was not a credible witness. 
Does this conclusion mean that the alleged incident on July 23 did not occur? Grievant 
testified that he absolutely did not read sexually graphic material to Ms. Howell. Yet he admitted 
that he went into Ms. Howell's office on July 23, and "may" have talked to her about the venue in 
the case. The file for the case contained the sexually graphic material complained of by Ms. Howell. 
It is unlikely that these two facts would be just coincidental. Grievant argued that a delay of more 
than six months in bringing the file to his attention is suspicious. 
The Hearing Officer does not completely rule out the possibility of some kind of conspiracy 
against Grievant. Both the delay in bringing the case to his attention, and Ms. Howell's and 
Ms. Ventura's apparent animosity toward Grievant are indeed highly suspicious. However, in the 
end, the fact remains that no actual evidence was presented which could be considered to prove that 
Ms. Howell selected the file and placed it on Grievant's desk as a way to "create" a situation she 
could use against Grievant. 
These factors, all taken together, lead to the conclusion that Ms. Howell's testimony of the 
event and Ms. Ventura's testimony as to Ms. Howell's state of emotions that day are more likely to 
be accurate than Grievant's testimony, which has an appearance of being self-serving. 
With respect to the August 28, 2002 incident, Grievant also denies making the racially 
derogatory comments of which he is accused. This incident has several perplexing aspects. 
Ms. Howell did not say in her testimony where the comments were made; whether they were in her 
office, Grievant's office, or somewhere else. Grievant attributed the comments to Darryl Armstrong, 
a DCFS investigator. However, Mr. Armstrong categorically and repeatedly denied making the 
comments. This in itself is not so surprising, nor is it very illuminating, because the Hearing Officer 
considers it unlikely that Mr. Armstrong or anyone else possessing a normal amount of common 
sense would voluntarily admit to making such comments. 
Another perplexing aspect of the case is that Grievant insists the discussion with Ms. Howell 
in which the derogatory comments were allegedly made occurred in his office. Mr. Armstrong 
Sorge v. Ofc of AG, 20 CSRB/H.0.298 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision Page 11 
insists equally strongly that the comments were made by Grievant in the Farmington courthouse. 
This conflict can be resolved by considering the testimony of Lori Trivino. 
Ms. Trivino stated that the conversation between Ms. Howell and Grievant on August 28, 
took place in Grievant's office. However, she did not identify the third party who had been in 
Grievant's office prior to Ms. Howell's entering it. Mr. Armstrong was unequivocal that his only 
conversation with Grievant in which the derogatory comment was made occurred at the Farmington 
courthouse. From the evidence given at the Step 5 hearing there appears to be no way to resolve the 
discrepancy between Grievant's testimony and Mr. Armstrong's about whether the conversation 
between them took place in Grievant's office or at the courthouse. However, the fact remains that 
Grievant had a conversation with someone in his office on August 28. When that person left 
Grievant's office, Ms. Howell stepped in and asked Grievant what was said. Grievant's response 
clearly upset Ms. Howell so noticeably that Ms. Trivino became concerned and tried to talk to 
Ms. Howell about it. 
Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that the Agency's allegations about the incidents 
which occurred on July 23 and August 28, 2002, are supported by the evidence produced in the 
hearing, and that they violated office policy and specific instructions given to Grievant. Having so 
concluded, the Hearing Officer must determine, giving deference to the Agency's decision, whether 
the Agency's disciplinary action is excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
The Agency has had very few personnel cases similar in nature to the instant case. Based on 
the limited information that is therefore available, there is no evidence that the Agency's decision 
to terminate Grievant's employment was excessive or disproportionate. 
In considering whether the Agency's decision constituted an abuse of discretion, this Hearing 
Officer generally refers to Utah Administrative Code, R477-11 -1 (3)(e), (2002). This rule provides: 
(e) When deciding the specific type and severity of the discipline to 
administerto any employee, the agency representative may consider 
the following factors: 
(i) Consistent application of rules and standards 
(ii) Prior knowledge of rules and standards 
(iii) The severity of the infraction 
(iv) The repeated nature of the violations 
(v) Prior disciplinary/corrective actions 
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(vi) Previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions 
(vii) The employee's past work record 
(viii) The effect on agency operations 
(ix) The potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or property. 
Although State agencies are not required to apply this rule, it provides a platform from which a 
determination may be made as to whether the Agency abused its discretion in deciding to terminate 
Grievant. 
In the instant case, Grievant had been employed at the Agency about three and one-half years. 
Grievant acknowledged that the corrective action plan he was placed on at the end of 2001, and his 
unsuccessful performance evaluation in June 2002, gave him notice of what conduct was expected 
of him. The corrective action in particular was explicit in directing Grievant to make no sexual 
comments to co-workers and to treat support staff with respect. Mr. Torgensen was verbally explicit 
in advising Grievant to avoid even the perception of offending his co-workers or clients. While there 
was not a series of progressive disciplinary actions taken by management during Grievant's 
employment, the main purpose of progressive discipline is to give an employee clear and 
unequivocal warning that his or her job may be in jeopardy from inappropriate or improper conduct. 
Grievant was given ample notice of what was expected of him. He knew or should have 
known that his conduct was under close scrutiny by management. He knew or should have known 
that even the perception of impropriety could place his job in jeopardy. Grievant's conduct on 
July 23, and August 28,2002, evidence a failure on Grievant's part to understand the seriousness of 
management's concerns with his conduct. As with any governmental agency or private business, 
relationship of workers with each other and of workers with customers or clients is a matter of 
primary importance to the successful operation of that agency or business, particularly when the 
budget or income of that agency or business is dependent on its relations with clients or customers. 
When management fails to understand that basic principle, its agency or business often fails. 
Grievant's history with the Agency demonstrated a continuing lack of understanding of the 
importance of Grievant's relationship with his co-workers and with the clients he served. This lack 
of understanding was evidenced in the interchange between Grievant and Darryl Armstrong during 
Mr. Armstrong's testimony. At one point, Grievant asked Mr. Armstrong, "Now you have indicated 
earlier that there was one instance where you might have had a disagreement with me on a case; is 
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that correct?" After considerable dialogue between Grievant and Mr. Armstrong pertaining to 
identification of the case in question, the questioning and testimony was: 
A, . . . I think I was upset about something that was said in the 
court at that time - -
Q. Oh. 
A. - - regarding my sloppiness of my work. And it had nothing 
to do with you, it had nothing to do with Mark May, it had to 
do with sloppiness of my work, and my work was not sloppy. 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A And you did not - -1 continually tried to prompt you and tell 
you what had actually happened to promote me to do the 
actions that I did. You didn't get up and say what I was trying 
to get you to say, and that's - - that's what my problem was. 
It has nothing with Mark May, it has nothing to do with - -
and - - and if you think that incident has anything to do with 
what I'm saying now, it's ridiculous. 
Q. No, that's not what I'm saying. Who said your work was sloppy? 
A. The judge. 
Q. Oh. 
A. She said that my work was sloppy. 
Q. Judge Wilkins can be very frank at times? 
Transcript of Excerpt from April 1, 2003, Testimony of Darryl Armstrong, pp. 52, 57-58. 
Even in the Step 5 hearing, it did not appear that Grievant understood the true nature of 
Mr. Armstrong's complaint, and the reason Mr. Armstrong "had a problem" with Grievant's 
representation of Mr. Armstrong in court. Rather, Grievant devoted considerable time and energy 
to defending his actions and his own professionalism instead of dealing with the problem as 
Mr. Armstrong perceived it. The Corrective Action Plan in December 2001 and January 2002, and 
Mr. Torgensen's discussions with Grievant during the spring of 2002, all emphasized the need for 
Grievant to maintain good relations with co-workers and with DCFS workers. They emphasized 
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specifically the need to avoid comments which could be perceived as offensive* Despite these 
warnings and admonishments, Grievant failed to recognize their importance to the Agency. 
This lack of understanding gives strong credence to Mr, Hintze's conclusions, in both his 
testimony and in the Notice of Termination, that management could no longer control Grievant's 
conduct, that Grievant had not altered his conduct despite the warnings, and that his conduct left the 
Agency at risk for possible adverse actions against the Agency by reason of Grievanfs continuing 
conduct 
It is unfortunate that Grievant did not recognize the importance of his relations with others 
and how his own conduct affected those relationships. As noted in the Corrective Action Plan, 
Grievant was a hard worker who handled a large caseload in a timely manner, performed his work 
very quirjdy, and did a good job of representing the Agency in court. However, considering the 
totality of the evidence in this case, the Hearing Officer can find no abuse of discretion in the 
Agency's decision to terminate Grievanfs employment. 
DECISION 
The decision of the Agency to terminate Grievant's employment effective October 17,2002, 
for just cause and for the good of the public service is affirmed. 
It is so ORDERED this i^day of April 2003. 
K. Allan Zabel ^ V 
Hearing/Presiding Officer 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days 
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b), 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten 
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i). 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
JOHN D. SORGE, : 
: DECISION 
Grievant and Appellant : AND 
: FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
v. : 
UTAH OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, : 
Agency and Respondent. : Case No, 8 CSRB 72 
On Tuesday, September 7, 2004, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) 
completed its appellate review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and 
an executive session. The following Board members were present and heard oral argument at the 
hearing and deliberated in executive session: Teresa N. Aramaki, Joan M. Gallegos, 
Felix J. McGowan, Acting Chairman, and Kevin C. Timken. At the hearing, John D. Sorge 
(Appellant) was present and represented by Erik Strindberg, Attorney at Law, who presented oral 
argument on Appellant's behalf. Assistant Attorney General J. Francis Valerga represented the 
Utah Office of the Attorney General (Agency and AG) and presented oral argument on the Agency's 
behalf. Finally, Assistant Attorney General Geoffrey Landward was present at the hearing but did 
not participate in the hearing and was there for observational purposes only. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code Annotated at §§ 67-19a-101 
through -408 (hereinafter Utah Code) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures 
Act, which is a sub-part of the Utah State Personnel Management Act at §§ 67-19 -1 to -42. The 
CSRB's administrative rules are published in the Utah Administrative Code at Rl 37-1-1 to -23. 
This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the final administrative review in the State Employees' 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Mr. Sorge's appeal from termination of his employment. Both 
the Board's evidentiary/Step 5 and these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal 
adjudications" pursuant to Rl 3 7-1 -18(2)(a). Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA) pertaining to formal adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and 
Step 6 hearings. {Utah Code, §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -23) 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On or about September 27, 2002, Appellant was given a notice of intent to terminate him 
from his position as an Assistant Attorney General with the Child Protection Division. (Gvt. Ex. 1) 
This Notice of Intent was signed by Mary T. Noonan who was then the Division Chief over the 
Child Protection Division of the Agency, At the time the Notice of Intent was issued, Appellant had 
been employed as an attorney with the Child Protection Division for approximately three and one-
half years. 
This September 27, 2002 Notice of Intent recommended that Appellant's employment be 
terminated for violation of Office Policy 2.11, Sexual Harassment. (Gvt. Ex. 1) Specifically, the 
Agency alleged in this notice that Appellant had engaged in two incidents of inappropriate conduct: 
one occurring on July 23,2002, and the other on August 28,2002. Both of these incidents occurred 
after the Agency transferred Appellant from the Ogden office to the Clearfield office and after the 
Appellant had been placed on a Corrective Action Plan. (Gvt. Ex. 6)1 
After receiving the September 27,2002 Notice of Intent, Appellant requested a hearing with 
Mark L. Shurtleff, the Attorney General for the State of Utah. Attorney General Shurtleff delegated 
this responsibility to Raymond Hintze (Mr. Hintze), Chief Deputy Attorney General, who met with 
Appellant and Appellant's attorney, Mr. Erik Strindberg, in a Step 4 hearing on October 10, 2002. 
After this hearing, Mr. Hintze conducted additionatl interviews, reviewed documents and read a 
transcript of a September 4, 2002, interview between Appellant and Agency investigators 
Ross Larsen and Jade Pusey. Mr. Hintze then made a recommendation to the Attorney General to 
terminate Appellant's employment. After review of Mr. Hintze's recommendation, Attorney 
General Shurtleff made the final decision to terminate Appellant's employment with the Agency. 
Appellant received notice of the Agency's final decision on October 17, 2002. (Gvt. Ex. 2) 
In Attorney General Shurtleff s written decision, he concluded that the intent to terminate 
Appellant's employment was justified, and denied Appellant's appeal. (Id) His conclusions were 
based generally on the reasons stated in the Notice of Intent to Terminate and specifically on three 
incidents which occurred in the Clearfield Attorney General's Office after an unsatisfactory 2002 
performance review and transfer from Ogden to Clearfield. The three incidents included the July 23 
1
 While the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) was entered into the exhibits as to notice only, the Agency appears 
to have terminated the CAP early. The CAP began on or about December 20,2001 (Findings of Fact, #3) and 
was ended early by management in February 2002 (Findings of Fact, #5). 
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and August 28 incidents previously mentioned in the Notice of Intent to Terminate, as well as a third 
incident the Notice only mentioned in passing2 - that of comments made in July 2002 regarding 
Appellants Concealed Firearm Permit and comments made at a staff meeting in Clearfield where 
Appellant discussed the impact delivered by hollow-point ammunition. 
In reaching his final decision, Attorney General Shurtleff concluded that Appellant's 
dismissal was for: 
u[N]ew incidents ... which cannot and will not be tolerated and which, when 
coupled with the incidents described in the Notice of Intent, justify my ultimate 
conclusion." 
(id.) 
On October 28,2002, Appellant timely filed his appeal of Attorney General Shurtleff s Final 
Decision with the CSRB.3 
2
 On page 2 of the Notice of Intent to Terminate, Ms. Noonan writes: "Jennifer [Howell].. .was afraid for her 
safety because of comments you [Appellant] had earlier made regarding a concealed weapon and the use of 
hollow-point bullets." Mark Shurtleff s letter amplifies his concerns regarding this incident. The Hearing 
Officer, however, concluded that this incident does not justify termination. 
3
 The procedural record is extensive in the case. A Prehearing/Scheduling Conference was held on 
November 19, 2002, and a Summary and Order was issued November 25, 2002. Discovery was requested 
on January 9, 2003. The CSRB received a Motion to Set Aside Grievant's Termination of Employment on 
January 27, 2003. On January 29, 2003, the CSRB Administrator wrote to Apellant in response to 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Grievant's Termination of Employment or in the Alternative Demand for 
Immediate Assignment of Officer and Discovery. In this letter, it was agreed that a formal written response 
to this motion would not be necessary. It was followed the same day with a Decision and Order assigning 
K. Allan Zabel as Hearing Officer in this matter. A Prehearing/Scheduling Conference was held on 
February 4, 2003. At this prehearing, Appellant received Agency's Answers to Grievant's Request for 
Discovery. A Motion to Quash Agency's February 4 2003 Motion in Limine and Order was received on 
February 13,2003, along with the Grievant's Response to Agency's February 4,2003 Answers to Grievant's 
Request for Discovery. Arguments on Agency's Motion in Limine and Agency's Objections to Discovery 
were heard on February 18, 2003, and an order issued on February 20, 2003. An Amended Request for 
Discovery was received February 25, 2003. On March 3, 2003 the Agency supplied CSRB with its Answers 
to Grievant's Request for Discovery Purusant to Order on Objections and on March 6, provided Agency's 
Final Witness List. On March 10, the Agency provided an Answer to Grievant's Amended Request for 
Discovery and Appellant provided his Final List of Witnesses. On March 12, Agency's Objection to 
Excessive Number of Grievant Witnesses was received, and on March 13, the CSRB received Greivant's 
Response to Agency's Objection to Excessive Number of Grievant's Witnesses. A Motion to Compel 
Discovery was received from Appellant on March 18, 2003. The CSRB issued an Order on Agency's 
Objection to Grievant's Witness List on March 20. On March 24, the CSRB received Appellant's Motion 
to Reconsider Some Witnesses on Grievant's Final Witness List. The Agency replied to Grievant's Motion 
for Reconsideration on March 25. The CSRB issued an Order on Grievant's Motion to Reconsider Some 
Witnesses on March 25. The Agency made a Motion for Protective Order and Return of Document which 
was received by the CSRB on March 25. Appellant filed a Request for Stipulation of Grievant, Agency, and 
Hearing Officer and Order allowing telephonic subpoenas for First and Second District Juvenile judges which 
was received by the CSRB on March 26, 2003. The CSRB Hearing Officer issued an Order on Grievant's 
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. S T E P 5 EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND R U L I N G 
On March 31, April 1-4 and 9, 2003, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held before CSRB 
Hearing Officer K. Allan Zabel (Hearing Officer). At the hearing, Appellant was present and 
represented himself, pro se. The Agency was represented by Assistant Attorney General 
Stephen G. Schwendiman, who was assisted by Agency Management Representative Mary Noonan, 
then Division Chief, Child Protection Division, Office of the Attorney General, for the Agency. 
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code, 
§67-19a-406. Moreover, because Appellant's employment was terminated, the Agency had the 
burden of proving its case by substantial evidence and the burden of going forward. (Utah Code, 
§67-19a-406(2)(a) and (c)) The specific issues adjudicated at the Step 5 hearing were twofold. 
First, did the Agency terminate Appellant's employment to either (a) advance the good of the public 
service, or (b) for just cause? If not, what would be the appropriate remedy? 
Approximately two weeks before the Step 5 hearing, on March 10,2003, Appellant provided 
the Hearing Officer with a Final Witness List consisting of sixty-nine witnesses. On March 12, 
Motion to Reconsider some Witnesses, Agency Motion for Protective Order, Agency's Motion to Reconsider 
Order to Compel, Grievant's Request for Stipulation, and Cutoff of Discovery and Motions on March 26. 
On March 28, a Supplement to the aforementioned Order was issued. The Step 5 Hearing was held on 
March 31, April 1-4 and 9, 2003. The Findings of Fact., Conclusions of Law and Decision (Step 5 Decision) 
was entered on May 23,2003. The CSRB received Appellant's Notice of Appeal and Request for Expedited 
Hearing on May 8,2003. On May 9,2003, the CSRB issued a letter to Appellant explaining the procedures 
involved in ordering a transcript of the Step 5 proceedings. Appellant received this letter on May 13, 2003. 
On August 5, 2003, a Scheduling Order was issued by the CSRB fixing September 2, 2003 as the day 
Grievant's brief was due, and October 2, 2003 as the date the Agency's brief was due. This order was 
remailed to Appellant on August 12, 2003, after it was determined the first order was mailed to an address 
from which the Apellant had moved. The CSRB did not receive Appelant's brief by the September 2, 2003 
deadline. On January 5, 2004, the CSRB issued an Order to Show Cause asking Appellant to show why his 
appeal should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. On January 20,2004, the CSRB received Appellant's 
response to the Order to Show cause. On January 20, 2004, Appellant filed his Brief. The Agency filed a 
motion on January 28 to Extend the Time to File its Response Brief, and the CSRB granted the Agency until 
August 9, 2004, to file its brief. On June 4, 2004, Appellant filed a Motion to Clarify the extension of time 
the CSRB granted the Agency for filing their brief. On June 7, the Agency filed a memo in opposition to 
Appellant's Motion to Clarify. The CSRB denied Appellant's motion in an order dated June 16,2004. The 
Agency filed its brief August 9, 2004. Also on August 9, the Agency submitted its application for an 
exception to the page limitation set forth in Utah Admin. Code, R137-l-18(13). Appellant responded to the 
Agency's Brief on August 16, with an Objection to Agency's Request to Change Findings of Fact. Appellant 
also requested an Expedited Step 6 Hearing and the CSRB received the request on August 17, 2004. The 
Agency responded to Appellant's objection to requesting a change in the findings of fact on August 24,2004. 
Finally, on August 25, 2004, the CSRB issued a Notice of Administrative Appeal Hearing Before the Board 
fixing the date and time for the Step 6 Hearing at 11a.m. on September 7, 2004. 
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2003, counsel for the Agency, StephenG. Schwendiman, filed the Agency's Objection to Excessive 
Number of Grievant's Witnesses. The CSRB issued subpoenas for Appellant's witnesses, but on 
March 25, 2003, two days prior to the date the Step 5 hearing was to begin, the Hearing Officer 
issued an Order on Grievant's Motion to Reconsider Some Witnesses, Agency's Motion for a 
Protective Order, Agency's Motion to Reconsider Order to Compel, Grievant's Request for 
Stipulation, and Cutoff of Discovery and Motions. Appellant did not receive this order until 
March 26, the day before the hearing was to begin on March 27. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Hearing Officer entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision (Step 5 
Decision) dated April 23, 2003. In this decision, the Hearing Officer examined the evidence 
presented at the hearing, including the legal arguments raised by Appellant, and concluded that there 
was substantial evidence to support the Agency's decision to terminate Mr. Sorge's employment and 
that such discipline was not excessive, disproportionate, nor was it an abuse of discretion. (Step 5 
Decision at 2) 
Grievant's employment was terminated by the Agency for three incidents: (1) comments 
made in a staff meeting on July 18, 2002, regarding a gun; (2) sexually explicit comments made to 
a co-worker on July 23,2002; and (3) offensive comments made to a co-worker on August 28,2002. 
The Hearing Officer found that the gun comments were indeed made, but also ruled that they could 
not be used to terminate Grievant's employment because they were not sufficiently offensive. 
(Step 5 Decision at 7) He found that the incidents on July 23, and August 28, did occur, and that 
they were sufficient to terminate Grievant's employment. 
A. The July 23 Incident 
Grievant worked in a four-person office in Clearfield. The three other employees who 
worked with him were a senior attorney and office supervisor named Janice Ventura, a paralegal 
named Jennifer Howell, and a secretary named Lori Trivino. 
In the afternoon of July 23, 2002, Grievant and Ms. Howell were alone in the office. 
Grievant entered Ms. Howell's office with a case file in his hand. The door shut behind him. (Tr.I 
at 139) Ms. Howell got up and opened the door because she did not want to be alone with Grievant 
in the office. (Tr.I at 140,143) The case file Grievant was holding dealt with the sexual molestation 
of a minor female. His reason for entering Ms. Howell's office, according to his testimony, was to 
discuss the venue of the case. (Tr.I at 145-146) However, Ms. Howell knew nothing about the case 
and told him so. She told him he would have to talk to the DCFS case worker and offered to get the 
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case worker on the phone. (Tr.I at 145) Grievant told Ms. Howell not to call the case worker. He 
then proceeded to read aloud to Ms. Howell from the file. The material he read was sexually graphic 
and explicit. (Agency Ex. 8) (Tr.I at 147) He stayed in her office reading aloud from the case file 
and attempting to engage her in conversation about the case for approximately 45 minutes. 
Ms. Howell tried on numerous occasions during the meeting to call the case worker but was 
unsuccessful. She did not stop him from reading because "he was her boss" and "she was afraid of 
him." (Step 5 Decision at 4) (Tr.I at 166) Ms. Howell felt "offended," "upset," "violated," and 
"sick to [her] stomach." (Tr.I at 165-172) After Grievant finally left her office, she cried. 
(Tr.I at 169) 
Later that afternoon, Janice Ventura returned to the office. Ms. Howell entered 
Ms. Ventura's office and explained what happened. Ms. Ventura testified that Ms. Howell was 
"upset," "shaking," and "crying." (Tr.I at 297) Ms. Ventura's testimony was consistent with the 
testimony of Ms. Howell. In Grievant's testimony regarding the July 23 incident, he admitted that 
he entered Ms. Howell's office, but testified they discussed issues solely related to venue. He 
completely denied reading the sexually graphic material in the file. (Tr.V at 1352-53) (Step 5 
Decision at 10-11) 
Notwithstanding Grievant's denials, the Hearing Officer found the July 23 incident took 
place as alleged and testified to by Ms. Howell. (Step 5 Decision at 4, 7, 10-11) While he 
questioned Ms. Howell's credibility, he questioned Grievant's credibility even more. Moreover, 
while other witnesses (Ms. Ventura and Ms. Trivino) gave testimony that at least indirectly 
supported the testimony of Ms. Howell, no one gave testimony that supported Grievant's version 
of the events. 
We agree with the Agency that the record in the instant case is replete with evidence to 
support the finding of the Hearing Officer that the July 23 incident took place. No credible evidence 
supports the argument that it did not take place. As further found by the Hearing Officer, 
"Ms. Howell's testimony of the event and Ms. Ventura's testimony as to Ms. Howell's state of 
emotions that day are more likely to be accurate than Grievant's testimony, which has an appearance 
of being self-serving." (Step 5 Decision at 11) We sustain the findings of the Hearing Officer on 
the July 23 incident. 
B. The August 28 Incident 
The August 28 incident consisted of Grievant making an offensive remark to Ms. Howell 
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about young Hispanic women. Even though Grievant denied the incident occurred in the manner 
alleged by the Agency, the Hearing Officer found that it did occur and used it along with the July 23 
incident to uphold Grievant5 s termination. 
On Appeal, the Agency asks this Board to change one of the Hearing Officer's Finding of 
Fact. While we agree there may have been some confusion on this finding, we are not ready to 
change it, nor do we feel it materially affects the conclusion reached by the Hearing Officer. We 
further find that no abuse of discretion attaches to the finding nor the Hearing Officer's conclusion 
as a result of the finding. 
In arguing that the Board should exercise its discretion by correcting one of the Hearing 
Officer's findings of fact, the Agency asserts the Hearing Officer apparently misunderstood some 
of the testimony regarding the August 28 incident, and because of that misunderstanding made an 
erroneous finding of fact. (Finding of Fact No. 27) This erroneous finding of fact, the Agency 
argues, unfairly marginalizes the seriousness of the August 28 incident and weakens the Agency's 
overall case. The Agency asked the Board to sustain the Hearing Officer's ultimate conclusion on 
the August 28 incident, while correcting Finding of Fact No. 27 in the Hearing Officer's Step 5 
Decision to reflect the true context in which the August 28 incident took place. 
In asking to have its cake and eat it too, the Agency goes too far. Finding of Fact No. 27 in 
the Step 5 Decision reads as follows: 
In the morning of August 28, 2002, Ms. Howell overheard part of a conversation 
between Grievant and another person in Grievant's office. After the other person left 
Grievant's office, Ms. Howell went to Grievant's office and asked Grievant what had 
been said. Grievant said, referring to a case, "In Hispanic culture 25-year-old men 
often have sex with 14-year-old girls." Ms. Howell immediately stood up and 
responded loudly, "That is so wrong. It is not at all true and I am very offended." 
Grievant replied that it was not his statement; Darryl Armstrong made the statement. 
(Step 5 Decision at 6) 
The Agency claims Finding of Fact No. 27 is wrong because Ms. Howell did not "overhear 
part of a conversation between Grievant and another person," and after the other person left, she did 
not go to Grievant's office to ask Grievant "what had been said." The Agency claims Grievant was 
not simply repeating what he heard Darryl Armstrong say, but that Grievant was repeating to 
Ms. Howell a statement he himself had previously made to Mr. Armstrong. 
Grievant's version of the August 28 incident is as follows: (a) that a DCFS case worker 
named Darryl Armstrong was in Grievant's office on August 28, and while there, Mr. Armstrong 
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made the statement that, "in the Hispanic culture young Hispanic women frequently have sexual 
relations with older Hispanic men and such relationships are perfectly acceptable in the Hispanic 
culture"; (b) that Ms. Howell overheard part of that conversation; (c) that after Mr. Armstrong left 
Grievant's office, Ms. Howell stepped into Grievant's office and asked Grievant what he and 
Mr. Armstrong had been talking about; (d) that Grievant repeated Mr. Armstrong's statement to 
Ms. Howell; (e) that if Ms. Howell was offended by what Grievant said it was not Grievant's fault 
since he was just repeating what Mr. Armstrong said and Ms. Howell asked him to repeat it. (Tr. V 
at 1353-55, 1369-75) 
The Agency points out that the only witness in the Step 5 hearing who supported Grievant's 
version of the August 28 incident was Grievant himself. No other witness supported his version. 
All the other witnesses who addressed the August 28 incident, Jennifer Howell, Lori Trivino, and 
Darryl Armstrong, supported the Agency's version. It is clear that the Hearing Officer believed the 
three Agency witnesses over the Grievant; otherwise, he would not have sustained the August 28 
charge against Grievant. 
The Agency's main problem with the finding is the way Finding of Fact No. 27 is written, 
particularly the first two sentences, because in the Agency's words it sounds as though Grievant was 
sitting in his office minding his own business when Ms. Howell walked in and asked him to explain 
something she had overheard him talking about with someone else. When Grievant responded to 
her inquiry by telling him what he had been talking about with the other person (Darryl Armstrong), 
Ms. Howell was offended by it. If that version is allowed to stand, Agency claims it hurts its case 
because it makes it appear that Ms. Howell was the person who initiated the discussion, that 
Grievant simply responded to her request for information, and that Grievant should not be faulted 
for providing that information to her. 
The Agency submits the August 28 incident did not happen as set forth in Finding of Fact 
No. 27. Rather, the Agency's version of the August 28 incident is as follows: (a) sometime prior 
to August 28, Grievant and Darryl Armstrong were in the hallway of the Farmington courthouse, 
having just finished handling a case involving a 14-year-old Hispanic female who was molested by 
her Hispanic stepfather (Tr.II at 509-10); (b) Grievant told Mr. Armstrong that Grievant believed 
the female "had the hots" for her stepfather and must have enjoyed being molested because she 
voluntarily went on a road trip with him (Tr.I at 182, 510-15); (c) Mr. Armstrong tried to correct 
Grievant's racially offensive remark by telling him that is not the way it is in the Hispanic culture 
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(Tr.III at 812-13); (d) that on August 28, without any prior inquiry or urging from Ms. Howell, 
Grievant invited Ms. Howell into his office and gratuitously repeated his racially offensive remarks 
to her (Tr.I at 181-82); and (e) after the termination letter was issued against Grievant by the 
Attorney General's Office, and one of the charges against him was the August 28 incident, Grievant 
made up the story that Mr. Armstrong, not Grievant, made the offensive remark, that he made it in 
Grievant5s office rather than in the Farmington courthouse, and that Ms. Howell overheard it and 
asked Grievant about it. 
The Agency's version of the August 28 incident is supported by the nearly uncontroverted 
testimony of Ms. Howell, Ms. Trivino, and Mr. Armstrong. Indeed, other than Grievant's testimony, 
which the Hearing Officer characterized as "self-serving" (Step 5 Decision at 10-1 1), the Agency's 
version is uncontroverted. 
The Agency believes the Hearing Officer made the following two fundamental errors in 
analyzing the August 28 incident: (1) He misunderstood part of Ms. Howell's testimony, and (2) 
He misunderstood part of Ms. Trivino's testimony. The part of Ms. Howell's testimony the Agency 
claims he misunderstood was the part about where the offensive comments were made. In his Step 5 
Decision, the Hearing Officer states: "Ms. Howell did not say in her testimony where the comments 
were made; whether they were made in her office, Grievant's office, or somewhere else." (Step 5 
Decision at 11) The Agency believes the Hearing Officer is simply wrong in this assessment of 
Ms. Howell's testimony. Ms. Howell did indeed say where the offensive comments were made. 
She said they were made in Grievant's office. (Tr.I at 181-82) 
Thus, the Hearing Officer's statement that Ms. Howell did not say where the offensive 
comments were made appears to be inaccurate. It is not clear exactly what part of Ms. Trivino's 
testimony the Hearing Officer misunderstood, but it had something to do with whether 
Mr. Armstrong had been in Grievant's office just before Ms. Howell entered it. In his Step 5 
Decision, the Heatmg Office* appeats to s t o g i e with the question of whethet the conversation 
between Grievant and Mr. Armstrong took place in the Farmington Courthouse or in Grievant's 
office. (Step 5 Decision at 11-12) For some unknown reason, the Hearing Officer says the question 
"can be resolved by considering the testimony of Lori Trivino." (Step 5 Decision at 12) However, 
a reading of Ms. Trivino's testimony (set forth above and found in Tr.II at 421-24) clearly shows 
she said absolutely nothing about Mr. Armstrong or any other third party being in Grievant's office 
before Ms. Howell went into his office. Indeed, neither Ms. Howell, Ms. Trivino, nor 
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Mr. Armstrong said anything about someone being in Grievanfs office just before Ms. Howell went 
into his office. The only one who said anything about that was the Grievant himself, and since the 
Hearing Officer discounts Grievanfs credibility throughout the Step 5 Decision, it makes no sense 
for him to believe Grievant on that narrow issue, particularly since none of the other witnesses 
supports it. 
The testimony of Grievant and Mr. Armstrong on the August 28 incident are at odds. 
Grievant claims Mr. Armstrong made the racially offensive remark and he, the Grievant, simply 
repeated it to Ms. Howell. Mr. Armstrong denies making the remark. He says Grievant made it. 
The Agency argues that Mr. Armstrong should be believed over the Grievant for three reasons. 
First, as previously discussed, the Hearing Officer found Grievant not to be credible. (Step 5 
Decision, Finding of Fact No. 31, and at 10-11) On the other hand, the Hearing Officer made no 
adverse credibility finding against Mr. Armstrong. Second, Grievant's testimony on the issue is not 
very convincing. The Hearing Officer described it as "self-serving." On the other hand, 
Mr. Armstrong's testimony on this issue is very detailed, clear, and specific. A careful reading of 
his testimony in the transcript shows it to be reasoned, balanced, and logical. (Tr.II at 512) Third, 
it is unreasonable to believe Mr. Armstrong would make the racially inflammatory remark about 
Hispanics attributed to him by Grievant. Mr. Armstrong is married to a Hispanic woman who is a 
member of the Governor's Hispanic Affairs Committee. (Tr.II at 511-12, 692, 908) He is 
sympathetic to and knowledgeable about Hispanic issues and not inclined to slander Hispanics. 
(Tr.II at 512, 908) 
The Board finds that while there is some confusion regarding the specifics of the events 
surrounding the August 28 incident, the conclusions drawn by the Hearing Officer are sustained; that 
the actions of the Appellant resulted in good cause for terminating his employment after having been 
put on notice that offensive behavior will not be tolerated. Appellant's attempt to claim he was only 
repeating the offensive remarks of others is insufficient to establish the Hearing Officer's finding 
was not supported by substantial evidence. However, based upon our review of the extensive 
record, the Board finds it unnecessary to correct or amend this finding in reaching our decision. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In Appellant's appeal before this Board, he challenges several aspects of the Hearing 
Officer's Step 5 decision. Specifically, Appellant argues that the Hearing Officer's ruling to limit 
witnesses rises to the level of a due process violation, and further argues that the proportionality of 
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the penalty under the circumstances [dismissal] was grossly excessive and an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, Appellant argues that the finding by the Hearing Officer that witness Jennifer Howell was 
less than credible should put into doubt whether any of the acts cited as reasons for termination even 
occurred. Further, since the Hearing Officer indicated that he could not rule out the possibility of 
a conspiracy against the Appellant, Appellant argues that the credibility of witnesses against him 
is nonexistent and that termination under such circumstances is too severe a penalty. 
Each of these issues will be addressed in the remainder of this Decision and Final Agency 
Action. 
III. THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Admin. Code, R137-l-22(4)(a) - (c), 
(Supp. 2003), which reads as follows: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial 
evidence standard. When the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 record 
as a whgle, then the board may, in its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or 
make new or additional factual findings. 
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings based 
upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine 
whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, 
and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being 
granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing 
officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable 
and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of 
relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined according to the above provisions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact 
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing 
Officer on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the totality of 
the Agency's disciplinary penalty of termination of Appellant's employment is reasonable and 
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rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts together with the correct application of 
relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were considered by our Hearing Officer. 
In matters of employee terminations, the Court of Appeals has consistently held that the 
CSRB's review role is limited. The CSRB should not disturb an agency's decision to dismiss an 
employee unless there is no factual support for the agency's action, and only upon showing that the 
agency's sanction is "so disproportionate to the charges that it amounts to an abuse of discretion." 
(Utah Dep 't of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Court went 
on to say punishment is within the agency head's discretion as long as "reasonable minds might 
differ as to [its] propriety." (Id at 448) See also, Kent v. Dept. of Employment Security, 860 P.2d 
984, 987 (Utah App. 1993) where the court held "the CSRB must affirm the Department's decision 
if it is within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." In reversing a decision of the Tooele 
County Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Commission, which had overturned the dismissal of a deputy sheriff 
in In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the reason 
why a department head must have broad latitude in disciplining employees. The Court said: 
The sheriff must manage and direct his deputies, and is in the best position to know 
whether their actions merit discipline. If the Merit commission finds upon review that 
the facts support the charges against the deputy, then it must affirm the sheriffs 
disciplinary action unless it finds the sanction so clearly disproportionate to the 
charges as to amount to an abuse of the sheriffs discretion. 
(Emphasis added.) (Id. at 1363) 
BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. THE ORDER LIMITING WITNESSES 
As stated above, the Board's first obligation on review is to make a determination of whether 
the factual findings of the Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial 
evidence standard (Rl 37-l-22(4)(a)). In the instant case, the Hearing Officer heard testimony from 
numerous witnesses including Appellant himself concerning the events precipitating the Agency's 
Notice of Intent to Terminate. As the Hearing Officer, Mr. Zabel was in the unique position to hear 
this testimony, weigh all the evidence presented at the hearing and deliberate on the testimony of 
the witnesses. The Board has previously outlined the tremendous amount of procedural motions and 
orders that preceded both the Step 5 hearing and Decision. (See n.3) 
Grievant argues that the Hearing Officer erred by not allowing him to call witnesses to rebut 
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the evidence regarding his prior work record. (Grievant's Brief atl-3) Grievant argues that due 
process requires him to have the opportunity to confront his accusers, no matter how old and final 
the accusations are, and to put on evidence to rebut their allegations against him. Grievant is in error 
on this point. 
While Utah has no case law on point, the CSRB has consistently followed the reasonable and 
practical rule of not allowing persons to relitigate matters which have come to rest.4 The reason for 
this rule is to allow employees and agencies to achieve finality in their affairs. Parties in Step 5 
hearings routinely introduce evidence, both positive and negative of an employee's work record. 
The authority for so doing is found in Utah Admin. Code, R137-l-21(9) which reads as follows: 
Past Work Record. In those proceedings where a disciplinary penalty is at issue, the 
past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of either mitigating 
or sustaining the penalty when substantial evidence supports an agency's allegations. 
The rule is silent regarding whether the parties can challenge the past work record by calling 
witnesses to support or rebut it. However, to allow such challenges would be administratively 
burdensome. To do so would be considered "relitigating" which is exactly what the court in Reece 
denounced. 
If parties were allowed to relitigate past work record, finality would never be achieved. 
Moreover, instead of taking one or two days to litigate a typical termination case at Step 5, it would 
take one or two months. It is not uncommon for parties to introduce 15 to 20 years' worth of 
performance appraisals, and numerous letters of commendation in a Step 5 hearing. When that 
happens, neither side objects, presumably because of R137-121(9) and several years of 
long-standing CSRB precedent. If parties were able to call witnesses to challenge the substantive 
nature of those records, hearings would go on ad infinitum and finality would never be achieved. 
In the instant case, the items in his work record that Grievant wishes to relitigate, i.e., the 
sexual harassment complaints from the three DCFS workers and Lynette Martinez, the 2001 
4Agency in its brief cited, and we concur, with the holding in Reece v. City of Columbus Board of Public 
Works and Safety, 498 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. App. I Dist. 1986.) Reece involved a police officer who appealed 
a demotion and claimed the administrative body that heard his case erred by not allowing him to put on 
evidence regarding a prior disciplinary action that was used against him in the hearing. In upholding the 
lower court which had prevented the officer from calling witnesses and putting on evidence against the prior 
discipline, the court of appeals said: 
[The officer] is not entitled to collaterally re-try prior, unappealed from, impositions of 
discipline. It takes no citation of authority to show that a thread exists throughout the law 
that a person may not relitigate matters which have come to rest. (Id. at 1278) 
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corrective action, and the 2001-2002 performance appraisal, have all become final. They have come 
to rest. It should also be noted that they did not come to rest because the Grievant was unaware of 
his rights. Grievant is an experienced attorney who is aware of his rights and not shy about 
exercising them. Grievant either challenged the items in his work record and lost, or the statute of 
limitations on his right to challenge them ran well before the Step 5 hearing commenced.5 
The ruling of the Hearing Officer not allowing Grievant to relitigate his prior work record 
was not error. It was a correct ruling, supported by law, long-standing CSRB precedent, and 
common sense. It did not violate any due process rights of the Grievant. We sustain the Hearing 
Officer on this point. 
II. DUE PROCESS ISSUES 
In Appellant's appeal before this Board, he also argues that in terminating his employment, 
the Agency violated due process, thereby requiring that his dismissal be overturned. Appellant's 
due process issues are based on several claimed errors. Each of these due process issues will be 
addressed herein. 
In Appellant's brief, he claims the Hearing Officer made multiple errors. Appellant claims 
the Hearing Officer erred when he denied Appellant's discovery motion to include witnesses ready 
to testify on issues involving Appellant's performance evaluation, Corrective Action Plan, and 
previous allegations mentioned in the Notice of Intent to Terminate and the Decision to Terminate 
letters of Mary Noonan and Mark L. Shurtleff Appellant summarizes the argument as "even a 
criminal defendant has a right to confront and cross-examine his accusers."6 
Appellant argues further that the scope of the Step 5 hearing was limited to three allegations 
allegedly occurring in the Clearfield office, and since the Hearing Officer found that the comments 
about a Concealed Firearms Permit and bullets did not violate a standard of conduct such as to 
justify or support termination (Conclusions No. 3, Step 5 Decision at 7) the termination rested on 
5Grievant considered filing a formal complaint or defamation lawsuit against Lynette Martinez. (Tr.III at 877-
879,1313-14) He told Ms. Howell he had a pending lawsuit against the Ogden office. (Tr.IVat 1107,1122) 
He appealed his corrective action to Attorney General Mark Shurtleff. (Tr.ID 871) He wrote several emails 
to Mr. Shurtleff complaining about Lynette Martinez's complaint and about being put on corrective action. 
(Tr.V at 1317-18) He personally requested and received an audience with Mr. Shurtleff to complain about 
his immediate supervisor. (Tr.I at 13, 15-16) He appealed his 2001-2002 performance appraisal to Chief 
Deputy Attorney General Ray Hintze. (Tr.V at 1345) 
6Grievant's Brief in Support of Grievant's Appeal to the Full Five Member Career Service Board at 2. 
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just two issues: the July 23 and August 28 incidents. He characterizes these incidents as a "he said, 
she said" factual situation between Appellant and Jennifer Howell. (Brief at 4) Appellant finds fault 
with and error on the part of the Hearing Officer for nevertheless concluding that the allegations of 
July 23, 2002, and August 28,2002, occurred even though Ms. Howell was not a credible witness. 
(Brief at 5) The Hearing Officer did, however, find witnesses with differing levels of credibility, 
and did not abuse his discretion in so ruling. 
Appellant claims the Hearing Officer automatically deferred to the State on the issue of 
whether or not the termination of his employment was excessive or disproportionate by giving no 
reason why the decision was not excessive nor disproportionate. While the Hearing Officer's 
decision indicated that the "Agency has had few personnel cases similar in nature to the instant case" 
and concluded that "[b]ased on the limited information that is therefore available, there is no 
evidence that the Agency's decision to terminate Grievant's employment was excessive or 
disproportionate" there is nothing inexplicable nor confusing about his decision. Without evidence 
of excessiveness or disproportionateness, the Hearing Officer is bound by law and rule to defer to 
the State. We do so likewise. 
Appellant claims the Hearing Officer erred when he went beyond the scope of allowable 
evidence to discuss Appellant's lack of understanding of the importance of Grievant's relationship 
with his co-workers and chides the Hearing Officer's inclusion of a dialogue between 
Darryl Armstrong and the Appellant when the Appellant never claimed to have told Mr. Armstrong 
that his work was sloppy. 
Appellant also claims error occurred when the Hearing Officer ruled that a Cliff Swenson 
could not be called to testify on Appellant's behalf because he was not present during an alleged 
outside-of-courtroom exchange between Darryl Armstrong and John Sorge prior to August 28,2002, 
yet during the Step 5 hearing, Ross Larsen testified Darryl Armstrong said that Cliff Swenson was 
present during that conversation. (Brief at 7) Appellant further claims error for not including 
Janell Pugh's testimony in the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order because of 
Ms. Pugh's opinion that she would not have taken issue with those things Ms. Howell testified 
occurred during the July 23 incident. 
Each of the three foregoing arguments falls within the Hearing Officer's realm of discretion 
in analyzing evidence and determining facts and rendering his decision. While reasonable minds 
might have included other testimony or excluded something in rendering a decision, we find no 
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abuse of discretion in the decision at hand. 
Finally, Appellant believes the Hearing Officer erred when he mentioned a newspaper article 
in his Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order in which Appellant was the subject of the 
article, but was refused by the Hearing Officer an opportunity to put on witnesses regarding the 
issues raised by the article. In his Brief, Appellant stated the Hearing Officer, after ruling to exclude 
the witnesses, "did mention the article at the end of his decision upholding the termination." (Brief 
at 12) Again, we find no abuse of discretion here. 
The Hearing Officer's exact words referring to the newspaper article were in the context of 
analyzing Ms. Howell's credibility in the July 2002 incident involving talk of a gun and bullets. The 
Hearing Officer summarizes Ms. Howell's testimony that she, not the Hearing Officer, testified that 
she saw a "pattern" within the Appellant sufficient that she needed to be protected against 
Appellant's rage. (Step 5 Decision at 9) Further, the Hearing Officer mentions that Ms. Howell 
believed the pattern to comprise several items, including "a news article about a claim of sexual 
harassment made against Grievant while Grievant was running for county attorney." (Step 5 
Decision at 9) 
It should be noted however, that while citing this article, the Hearing Officer specifically 
discounted this purported pattern by concluding that "none of these matters rise to the level of 
evidence that Grievant was a violent person or that he harbored a 'rage.'" Therefore, while 
Appellant may feel the Hearing Officer opened the door by mentioning this in his decision, the 
context clearly shows that the article failed to convince the Hearing Officer of the contention the 
witness hoped its mention would prove. We find no abuse of discretion nor due process violation 
in the mention of Ms. Howell's testimony in this manner. 
The Board concludes that Appellant clearly had an opportunity to be heard by the Agency 
head and present his side of the story. The Agency's final decision was not rendered until after such 
a hearing occurred. In light of the State's elaborate post termination procedures, these factors satisfy 
due process.7 
Ultimately, the Agency is responsible for insuring that appropriate behavior is exhibited in 
the workplace. When conduct exists in the workplace that implicates reasonably required behavioral 
standards, management must have the ability to address these concerns. 
7See Utah Code, §67-19a-101 to -408. 
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III. PROPORTIONALITY ISSUES 
As stated previously, Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(c) requires the Board to: 
[Determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing officer, 
including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is 
reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and 
correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes. 
In the instant case, Appellant argues before this Board that the disciplinary sanction of 
dismissal was excessive, disproportionate and otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion. In 
ruling on this issue, the Board notes that it is constrained by Utah Court rulings specifically 
addressing this issue. In Utah Department of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) the Utah Court of Appeals examined the parameters under which the Board may review 
disciplinary sanctions imposed by departments. At the time of Despain, the Board had a rule which 
stated: 
"[I]f the hearing officer finds that the action complained of which 
was taken by the appointing authority was too severe, even though 
for good cause, the hearing officer may provide for such other 
remedy or relief as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the 
respective parties."8 
In its decision, the Court of Appeals concluded that this language gave the CSRB the 
"authority to modify the Department's sanction only if the Department has abused its discretion in 
imposing that sanction." (Id. ) In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted the reasoning set forth 
in Szmaciarz v. California State Personnel Board, 79 Cal. App. 3d 904, 145 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1978) 
wherein that Court held: 
"[I]f the penalty imposed was under all the facts and circumstances 
clearly excessive, this will be deemed an abuse of discretion . . . In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion the 
Supreme Court of this state has stated that "If reasonable minds 
might differ as to the propriety of the penalty imposed, this fact 
serves to fortify the conclusion that the [administrative body] acted 
within the area of its discretion."9 
8This rule was set forth in Utah Admin. Code, R140-1-20(J) (1990). The Board notes that 
this rule has since been modified and is essentially cabined within the current CSRB 
R137-l-21(3)(b). 
9The Board notes with interest that shortly after the Court's decision in Despain, this Board 
amended its rules and essentially adopted the specific language set forth in the Despain decision. 
Specifically, at CSRB R137-l-21(3)(b), the Board adopted the following rule: 
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In the instant case, the Board has already found that there was substantial evidence to support 
the Hearing Officer's factual findings in this case. Those facts are detailed elsewhere in this 
decision. Applying the facts gleaned at the Step 5 hearing, the Hearing Officer concluded that: 
"[T]here is no evidence that the Agency's decision to terminate Grievant's employment was 
excessive or disproportionate." (Step 5 Decision at 12) 
Exercising his allowable discretion as set forth in CSRB R137-l-21(3)(b), the Hearing 
Officer concluded that the dismissal was not "excessive or disproportionate." (Step 5 Decision 
at 12) The Hearing Officer next addressed the abuse of discretion standard, and concluded that 
"[Considering the totality of the evidence in this case, [I] can find no abuse of discretion in the 
Agency's decision to terminate Grievant's employment." 
Pursuant to CSRB Rl 37-1-22(4), the Board's requirement is to determine whether the 
Hearing Officer's decision, including the totality of the sanction imposed by the agency, is 
reasonable and rational. Based on these rules and the Court of Appeals' decision in Despain, the 
Board finds the Agency's decision to be both reasonable and rational. In the instant case, the Board 
believes that reasonable minds could differ regarding the propriety of the sanction imposed. The 
Board further believes that the Agency could have done much more than it had in documenting and 
disciplining Appellant before terminating him. 
In the final analysis, however, no evidence was submitted by the Appellant regarding the 
disproportionateness or excessiveness of the Agency's decision. Argument was presented to suggest 
that the weight of witness credibility was misplaced, or that this whole case boils down to the word 
of Ms. Howell against the word of the Appellant. Appellant suggests that it is unfair to terminate 
When the CSRB hearing officer determines in accordance with the 
procedures set forth above that the evidentiary/step 5factual findings 
support the allegations of the agency or the appointing authority, 
then the CSRB hearing officer must determine whether the agency's 
decision, including any disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. In 
making this latter determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall give 
deference to the decision of the agency or the appointing authority 
unless the agency's penalty is determined to be excessive, 
disproportionate or constitutes an abuse of discretion in which 
instance the CSRB hearing officer shall determine the appropriate 
remedy. 
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based on the two incidents on which the hearing focused. However, the Agency did put Appellant 
on notice that his actions were inappropriately impacting the workplace. He was given an 
opportunity to succeed in a new post of duty assignment. He was asked by his superiors to be 
careful about how he conducted himself in the future, after receiving an unsuccessful performance 
evaluation and after having been placed on a Corrective Action Plan for a brief period. Reviewing 
this case in light of the Despain decision, we conclude that the Agency acted within its discretion 
in deciding to terminate Appellant's employment. 
Based on the facts as reported in the Step 5 hearing, the Board cannot, and indeed does not, 
find as a matter of law that the Agency's termination of Appellant's employment was excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise an abuse of discretion. 
IV. CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES 
In his Step 6 Brief at page 5, Grievant asks rhetorically how the Hearing Officer could have 
ruled against him in a "he said, she said" case where the Agency's primary witness was found to be 
less than credible. While the Hearing Officer may have found the Agency's primary witness to be 
less than credible, he found other Agency witnesses to be sufficiently credible to support her 
testimony. A total of fourteen witnesses were called in the hearing. Ten of the witnesses testified 
for the Agency and four of the witnesses testified for the Grievant. Of the Agency's ten witnesses, 
four testified either directly or indirectly about the two charges that were sustained by the Hearing 
Officer, i.e., the July 23 incident and the August 28 incident. Of the Grievant's four witnesses, only 
one, i.e., the Grievant himself, testified about the two incidents. The four Agency witnesses who 
testified either directly or indirectly about the two charges sustained by the Hearing Officer were 
Jennifer Howell, Janice Ventura, Darryl Armstrong, and Lori Trivino. Against the Agency, the 
Hearing Officer found Ms. Howell to be "a less than credible witness" (Step 5 Decision at 10) and 
Ms. Ventura's testimony suspect because of possible "bias" (Step 5 Decision at 8) and "apparent 
animosity" (Step 5 Decision at 11). For the Agency, the Hearing Officer made no negative 
credibility finding against Mr. Armstrong, and most important, made a positive credibility finding 
for Ms. Trivino. Specifically regarding Ms. Trivino, the Hearing Officer said: "While two of the 
witnesses may have held a bias against Grievant . . . the third witness, Lori Trivino, [did not]. 
Ms. Trivino's testimony was not shown to be biased in any way, and is therefore considered fully 
credible." (Step 5 Decision at 8) 
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The only witness for the Grievant who was able to testify either directly or indirectly about 
the two charges was the Grievant himself. As to the Grievant's credibility, the Hearing Officer 
stated: "Grievant strongly disputes both allegations. However, there is reliable evidence to support 
the allegations, while Grievant's own testimony appears to be self serving." (Emphasis added) 
(Step 5 Decision atlO) 
Rather than being a "he said, she said" case, the Hearing Officer used discretion in weighing 
various witnesses and their testimony. A review of the more than 1,500 pages of transcript in this 
case is a lengthy process, and one the Board took seriously. The Hearing Officer found the 
testimony of the four Agency witnesses, taken as a whole, to be believable, and the testimony of 
Grievant was not. We conclude that the Hearing Officer did not abuse his discretion in doing so. 
DECISION 
The Board has addressed each of the issues raised by Appellant in his appeal. After 
thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record, and carefully studying the due process issues raised 
by Appellant before this Board, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision for the reasons 
set forth herein and hereby denies Appellant's appeal to this Board. The decision sets forth in detail 
that Attorney General Mark L. Shurtleff had adequate cause or reason to terminate Appellant's 
employment. 
DATED this 4th day of November 2004. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Teresa N. Aramaki, Member 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Felix J. McGowan, Acting Chairman 
Kevin C. Timken, Member 
Felix J. M&Gowan, Acting Chairman 
Career Service Review Board 
CONCURRING OPINION 
Kevin C. Timken, Member 
I concur in the Board's decision. I write separately to address two matters of concern. 
First, I believe the Board has done Appellant a remarkable courtesy in addressing his due 
process arguments. While those arguments were presented capably and professionally by 
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Appellant's counsel during oral argument, they were mentioned only inferentially, at best, in 
Appellant's pro se brief. Appellant's brief never uses the words "due process," and Appellant, an 
attorney, presented a 14-page brief that failed to cite any case law or prior decisions of this Board. 
It is difficult to understand how Appellant expected this Board to overturn the Hearing Officer's 
decision on the basis of the brief he presented. It is not this Board's role to develop legal arguments 
for the parties that appear before it. 
I also want to identify what we have not done in this case. The Hearing Officer determined 
that the incidents of July 23 and August 28,2002, were sufficient to form the basis for the Agency's 
decision to terminate Appellant's employment, and this Board has determined that the Hearing 
Officer did not abuse his discretion in doing so. If, however, as Appellant's counsel suggested at 
oral argument, those two incidents, considered alone, had been insufficient to justify termination, 
and the Agency had also relied upon earlier matters in which the Agency had imposed discipline that 
our rules do not permit to be appealed to Steps 5 and 6, due process may well require that Appellant 
be permitted to call witnesses and contest those matters, regardless of whether they had previously 
"come to rest." In the end, that was not this case. 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action by complying 
with Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to Utah 
Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
Sorgev. Ofc. Of AG, 8 CSRB 72 
Decision and Final Agency Action Page 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 4th day of November 20045 (1)1 caused to be delivered via the United States 
Postal Service the foregoing Decision and Final Agency Action in the matter of John D. Sorge v. 
Utah Office of the Attorney General to the following: 
John D. Sorge 
Sorge Law Office 
Wells Fargo Center Building 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City UT 84111-2241 
(2) I emailed a copy of the original document to: 
Mark Shurtleff 
Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
MSHURTLEFF@utah.gov 
and (3) I faxed a copy of the original document to: 
Erik Strindberg 
Attorney at Law 




STRINDBERG SCHOLNICK & 
CHAMNESS, LLC 
44 Exchange Place, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
J. Francis Valerga 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
JFRANCISVALERGA@UtaLgov 
J. Francis Valerga 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
801.366.0101 
Claudia L. Jones 
Legal Secretary 
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